Introduction
The concept of secret sharing scheme was first developed by Shamir [1] and Blakley [2] independently in 1979 as a solution to safeguard cryptographic keys. After that, secret sharing schemes have been extensively studied in many literatures [3] [4] . In Shamir's   n t , threshold secret sharing scheme [1] , a secret is divided into n shares by a mutually trusted dealer and the n shares are distributed to n shareholders respectively, so that any t or more than t shareholders can recover this secret; but fewer than t shareholders cannot recover the secret. However, in Shamir's scheme [1] , the dealer must stay honest and make no mistakes while distributing shares to shareholders, and the shareholders should unconditionally trust the shares from the dealer are valid. In order to solve the problem that shareholders cannot verify their shares, Chor et al. [5] presented a verifiable secret sharing scheme by extending Shamir's scheme [1] . In a verifiable secret sharing scheme, shareholders are able to verify if the shares they received from the dealer are consistent or not.
In addition, the need of a mutually trusted dealer in Shamir's scheme [1] is another problem, because a trusted dealer might be impossible in some applications, such as wireless multimedia sensor networks and ad hoc networks. Ingemarsson and Simmons [6] tried to overcome the restriction and considered a secret sharing scheme without the assistance of a   n t n , , scheme, all shareholders participant in the secret generation phase and they are mutually distrusted. Consequently, it is even more desirable to possess the verifiable property in   n t n , , secret sharing schemes. We first give the definition of a   n t n , , verifiable (multi-)secret sharing scheme with secure secret reconstruction and the security requirements. Then a secret sharing scheme is given as a stepping stone. We propose a multi-secret sharing scheme by extending the given secret sharing scheme. As desired, our schemes are verifiable, can execute without a mutually trusted dealer, and have the good property of secure secret reconstruction. The security of the verification phase is based on the hardness of computation Diffie-Hellman problem. Without the help of a mutually trusted dealer makes our schemes more flexible. And our schemes can resist the attacks from the adversaries who try to obtain secrets but provide no valid shares. As far as we know, there have not been any secret sharing schemes that possess the three properties at the same time until now.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. Some preliminaries about our schemes, inclu ding Shamir's
secret sharing scheme and Harn's secure secret reconstruction scheme, are provided in the next section. A definition and the security requirements are represented in section 3. The proposed two schemes are elaborat ed in section 4 and section 5 respectively. In section 6, the comparisons among the proposed multi-secret scheme and some other multi-secret schemes are discussed. Section 7 includes th e conclusion of this work. secret sharing scheme and Harn's secure secret reconstruction scheme.
Shamir's
  n t ,
Secret Sharing Scheme [1]

Secret
S is divided into n shares by a mutually trusted dealer and shared among n shareholders
. n and t represent the number of shareholders and the threshold of the scheme respectively. p is a large prime, and all operations are performed in the finite field   p GF . Shamir's scheme has two algorithms: share generation and secret reconstruction.
(1) Share generation Firstly, the dealer
, where 
Pedersen's
  n t n , ,
Secret Sharing Scheme [7]
The master secret S , which is shared among n shareholders, is the sum of the sub-secrets selected by shareholders. There is no dealer in the scheme, and each shareholder does the job the dealer is supposed to do. Intuitively, each shareholder in this scheme participates to generate and share the master secret. This scheme consists of four algorithms: master secret generation, sub-share generation, master share generation and master secret reconstruction. When t or more than t shareholders release their master shares to reconstruct the master secret, the master secret S can be reconstructed by using the Lagrange interpolating formula.
Harn's Secure Secret Reconstruction Scheme [11]
A secret reconstruction scheme is secure when it makes sure that anyone without a valid sh are cannot reconstruct the real secret. It means that neither an outside adversary 1 nor an insid e adversary 2 can obtain the real secret without providing a valid share in a secure reconstructi on scheme. Sometimes there might be more than t shareholders participating in the secret re construction. When it happens, most papers suggest taking t of them to recover the secret. H owever, this approach causes a security problem that outside adversaries may pretend as share holders participating in the reconstruction but provide no share at all. As only t shares are n eeded to recover the secret, the adversaries can still obtain the secret when being aware of t valid shares from honest shareholders. In addition, inside adversaries (colluded shareholders) may collude trying to recover the secret. Harn's scheme can prevent the attacks from outside adversaries and colluded shareholders. Here are the two algorithms of Harn's secure secret re construction scheme.
(1) Share generation
, and generates shares
For the secret S , there are always integers cannot be used to derive 1 The outside adversary is an attacker who does not have valid shares generated initially and aims to get the master secret. 2 The inside adversary has two types: the cheater who has valid shares, but tries to defraud valid shares from other shareholders by releasing fake shares; and the colluded shareholder who colludes to recover the secret with other colluded shareholders. The number of colluded shareholders should be less than the value of threshold. 
Definition and Security Requirements
verifiable (multi-)secret sharing scheme with secure secret reconstruction). A (multi-)secret sharing scheme is called a   n t n , , verifiable (multi-)secret sharing scheme with secure secret reconstruction if it does not need any mutually trusted dealer, and ensures that no shareholder can provide fake shares to others and that the secret(s) can only be reconstructed by honest participants.
A
verifiable (multi-)secret sharing scheme with secure secret reconstruction should satisfy the following security properties. These properties are elaborated as the ways to counter several major possible attacks in a (multi-)secret sharing scheme.
Property 1. Shareholder-cheating resistance
We call the action that inside adversaries intend to provide wrong or fake sub-shares to other participants in the secret reconstruction phase is the shareholder-cheating attack. A scheme is called shareholder-cheating resistance, as long as the scheme can perform normally when honest participants in the reconstruction are t or more than t . In addition, the property of shareholder-cheating resistance also keeps the scheme's threshold value consistent and makes the scheme robust.
Property 2. Conspiracy resistance
The conspiracy attack is assumed that 1  t or fewer colluded shareholders attempt to reconstruct some secret (note that the last secret may be the easiest one to obtain in the multi-secret sharing scheme). A conspiracy resistant scheme should ensure that the reconstructions of recovered secrets reveal no information about uncovered secrets.
Property 3. Outside-attack resistance
Assume the outside attack is that outside adversaries try to reconstruct the secrets by faking valid components. In order to make a scheme outside-attack resistant, the shares cannot be revealed in secret reconstructions or reused in different sessions.
The Proposed Secret Sharing Scheme
secret sharing scheme with secure secret reconstruction and its security analysis are elaborated in this section.
Notations
The notations of the proposed scheme are represented in Table 1 . 
Description
In order to construct a novel multi-secret sharing scheme, we propose the secret sharing scheme as a stepping stone. In the secret sharing scheme, the master secret S , which is determined jointly by all shareholders, is shared among n shareholders
There are three algorithms in the scheme: share generation, share verification and secret reconstruction. verifiable secret sharing scheme with secure secret reconstruction scheme.
Algorithms
Proof
Property 1. Shareholder-cheating resistance
Analysis: The share verification phase makes sure that the sub-shares released by shareholders must be valid, so it can prevent the attacks from the cheaters. And according to the hardness of computation Diffie-Hellman problem, the commitments
reveal no information about sub-shares. Consequently, the secret reconstructed by any adversary who provides a wrong or fake component is not the same with the real one.
Property 2. Conspiracy resistance
Analysis: For security analysis, the adversaries are given an ultimate ability they supposed to have, i.e., there are 
cannot be solved by the adversary. As a result, the outside adversary cannot construct a valid component or recover the master secret without providing a valid component.
The Proposed Multi-secret Sharing Scheme
We design a multi-secret sharing scheme by extending the secret sharing scheme presenting in section 4. The security analysis of the proposed multi-secret scheme is represented at the end of this section.
Notations
The notations of the proposed multi-secret sharing scheme are represented in Table 2 . 
Description
There are h secrets are shared among n shareholders
. The set of the secrets is denoted as
. This multi-secret sharing scheme is designed by extending the scheme in section 4, so it has all the good properties of that scheme but can share multiple secrets in each single process. This scheme also has three algorithms: share generation, share verification and secret reconstruction.
Algorithms
performs the following steps: i) selects
, we will prove this condition in the security analysis, random polynomials with
, which would be secretly sent to shareholder
, which would be released publicly as commitments for other shareholders to verify the sub-shares they have received from 
Security Analysis
Theorem 2. The proposed multi-secret sharing scheme is a 
